A lattice-based group signature scheme (LGSS) is an active cryptographic primitive, where each group member can sign messages anonymously in the name of the entire group and each valid signature should be traced to some group member on the lattice. In each LGSS, the size of the group signature usually depends on the number of group members and the security parameter. Thus, designing a constant-size LGSS is an interesting problem. At PKC 2018, Ling, Nguyen, Wang and Xu presented the first constant-size group signature scheme under lattice assumptions. Its design is based on a zero-knowledge argument of the knowledge of a valid message-signature pair for the Ducas-Micciancio signature scheme, which follows the sign-then-encrypt-then-prove protocol. In contrast to this work, we construct a new constant-size LGSS. The scheme adopts the sign-hybrid-encrypt approach and makes use of the Lyubashevsky signature scheme. Our work is efficient in the signing algorithm, more precise on the open algorithm and shorter in public key, secret key and signature size than previous studies. Furthermore, we prove that the scheme has full anonymity and full traceability under the Ring Learning With Errors and Ring Short Integer Solution assumptions in the random oracle model.
I. INTRODUCTION
The group signature introduced by Chaum and Van Heyst in [1] , is an important cryptographic concept. In each group signature scheme, users can sign messages on behalf of the group anonymously, because the resulting signature does not reveal the signer's identity. Moreover, the resulting message/signature pair is traceable when necessary, in the sense that users are kept accountable for the message/signature pair that they issue. These two appealing features make the group signature useful in many real-life applications, for instance, in trusted computing platforms, auction protocols or privacyprotecting mechanisms, and digital rights management.
In the group signature realm, the signature size has been the focus of research for decades. Generally, the group signature size depends on the size N of the group, in addition to the security parameter. In early studies [1] - [3] , the signature size grew linearly with N. The first approach in which the signature size was independent of N, and hence could be The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Ahmed Farouk. considered as a constant, was proposed in [4] , and was later extended in [5] - [7] .
To be precise, these group signature schemes [5] - [7] were built on the discrete logarithm assumption. With the development of post-quantum cryptography, the lattice-based group signature has become a research topic of great interest. In 2010, Gordon et al. [8] proposed the first group signature scheme based on lattice assumptions in the random oracle model, and its signature size is linear in N. Other latticebased models were proposed later [20] , [22] , [26] , and their signature sizes always depends on N. At PKC 2018, Ling et al. [9] constructed the first constant-size group signature scheme from lattices.
In the work of Ling et al., the core of the design is based on a zero-knowledge argument of the knowledge of a valid message-signature pair for the Ducas-Micciancio signature scheme (DMS) [10] . A similar protocol for the Boyen signature scheme [38] was proposed by Ling et al. [22] . There exists a natural problem of whether other efficient signature schemes can replace the DMS and Boyen signature scheme. Based on this, the Lyubashevsky signature scheme (LSS) [13] has drawn our attention, and is the first lattice-based signature scheme without a trapdoor. In the LSS, Lyubashevsky removed the hash-and-sign model and proposed rejection sampling. Because of the small signature size and simple signing algorithm, the LSS is popular in latticed signature research. There has been much recent progress on the Lyubashevsky model in terms of its security, efficiency, and performance, such as [14] - [18] . These studies inspired us to investigate the problem of designing a constant-size latticed-based group signature scheme (LGSS) using the LSS.
A. RELATED WORKS
The first LGSS was introduced by Gordon, Katz and Vaikuntanathan, and its solution produced signature size linear in N. Camenisch et al. [19] extended [8] to achieve anonymity in the strongest case. Then, Laguillaumie et al. [20] proposed the first scheme with the signature size logarithmic in N, at the cost of relatively large parameters. Later, simpler and more efficient solutions to the signature size were subsequently provided by Nguyen et al. [21] and Ling et al. [22] . Libert et al. [23] obtained substantial efficiency improvements via a construction based on merkle trees that eliminate the need for Gentry-Peikert-Vaikuntanathan trapdoors [24] . In 2016, a scheme supporting message-dependent opening [25] was proposed in [26] . All the schemes mentioned above were designed for static groups, and all have signature sizes that are dependent on N. Three LGSS were proposed by Langlois et al. [27] , Libert et al [28] , and Ling et al. [22] , which have certain dynamic features. Recently, Ling et al. [9] constructed the first constant-size group signature from lattices, and the scheme is based on the DMS. Katsumata et al. [29] made group signatures without NIZK from lattices in the standard model.
B. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
In this paper, we propose a new constant-size group signature scheme from lattices. First, we use a variant of the trapdoor generation algorithm to enroll new users. This approach reduces the number of public matrices to two, which reduces the size of both the public key and private key. Second, the scheme follows the sign hybrid encrypt protocol; at the core of its design is the LSS. We make a double Lyubashevsky signature. The LSS can promote the efficiency of the scheme and reduce the signature size. By contrast, the LSS ensures that when the input of the open algorithm is a valid signature signed by a real signer, it is impossible to output another signer's identity. Additionally, the result of the encryption scheme is used as some of the input for generating the random vector in the LSS, and some results of the LSS are used as the plaintext of the encryption scheme (sign-hybrid-encrypt). Moreover, our scheme is anonymous, in addition to traceable in the random oracle model. Furthermore, the security of the scheme is based on the Ring Learning With Errors (RLWE) and Ring Short Integer Solution (RSIS) assumptions that provide optimal performance for the scheme.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we provide the basic notation and some preliminary information. In Section 3, we recall the definition and security model of the group signature. In Section 4, we present our scheme. In Section 5, we analyze the scheme. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 6.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. BASIC NOTATION
Let k ∈ N be a positive integer and n = 2 k , q be a positive prime such that q ≡ 1( mod 2n). Consider rings of the
is the polynomial ring with coefficients in Z and x n + 1 is the cyclotomic polynomial of degree n. Represent this set using coefficients in the range [−(q − 1)/2, (q − 1)/2].
For any probability distribution f over Z q , if v ∈ R q , then v ← f n indicates that each coefficient of v is chosen from f . If g : Z → R is a probability distribution, then z ← g denotes element z that is chosen from Z according to probability distribution g.
We
B. GAUSSIAN DISTRIBUTION
We next recall the discrete Gaussian distribution, which is a common distribution on lattices. Before presenting the discrete Gaussian distribution, we introduce the continuous Gaussian distribution. The continuous Gaussian distribution over R n centered on v∈ R n with standard deviation σ is determined by its probability density function
Subscript v is usually omitted when v = 0 ∈ R n . Likewise, discrete Gaussian distribution D n over Z n centered at some v ∈ Z n with a standard deviation is determined by its probability mass function
.
Additionally, subscript v is also usually omitted when v = 0 ∈ Z n . Then, we recall two bounds for the discrete Gaussian distribution that is used in our scheme.
Lemma 1 (Discrete-Gaussian-Bound): ( [13] ) For any vector v ∈ R n and σ, r > 0, we have
In particular, for fixed κ > 0, when ζ > 2+2κ log 2 e , we have
In particular, for any v ∈ Z n , if ζ > 2+2κ log 2 e and σ = t · v for some t > 0, then
In the remainder of the paper, D σ is defined over R q , which is similar to the above definition.
C. RLWE PROBLEM AND RSIS PROBLEM
We now recall the RLWE and RSIS problems whose hardness ensures the security of our work. The RLWE problem was introduced by Lyubashevsky et al. [33] together with a worstcase to average-case reduction to certain ''hard'' problems over ideal lattices. Definition 1 (RLWE Distribution): RLWE distribution D s,χ , indexed by s ∈ R q and some pre-defined distribution χ on R q , is defined as the distribution that samples a ← R q , e ← χ and then outputs (a, as + e) ∈ R q × R q .
Definition 2 (RLWE Problem): The decision RLWE n,q,χ problem is to distinguish, with non negligible advantage, between any desired number of independent samples drawn from D s,χ for a single s ← R q , and the same number of uniformly random and independent samples over R q × R q .
The RSIS problem was proposed by Alwen and Peikert. The average-case RSIS problem is at least as hard as the SVP using a polynomial time quantum reduction. More details are available in [30] .
Definition 3 (RSIS Problem): When the parameters n,m,q, β are given, for a uniformly random A ← (R q ) 1×m , the problem is to determine a non-zero v ∈ (R q ) m such that Av = 0 ∈ R q and v ∞ ≤ β.
D. TRAPDOOR GENERATION ALGORITHM
We recall the trapdoor generation algorithm, which is used to enroll new users in our construction after some transformation.
Lemma 3 [12] , [31] , [32] : Let n, m, q > 0 be integers, where q is prime. A polynomial time algorithm exists:
• TrapGen(n, m, q) → (A, T A ): a randomized algorithm that when m = (n × log q), outputs full rank matrix A ∈ Z n×m q and basis T A of ⊥ q (A) (which implies, in particular A · T A = 0 mod q) such that A is negl(n)close to uniform and T A GS = O( √ n log q), with all but negligible probability in n, where ⊥ q (A) = {y ∈ Z m ; Ay = 0 mod q}, T GS = T (T is the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization of T ).
Note that for any A ∈ Z n×m q , we can view A as an mvector of R q according to the following method: Divide A into m blocks, that is, A = (a 1 , · · · , a m ). Then a i has n elements, that is, a i = (a i,0 , · · · , a i,n−1 ) T for any i ∈ [m], which can be the same as coefficients of an element in R q . The method is also equal to (1, · · · , x n−1 )A, that is, an mvector of R q . Additionally, for any m-vector of R q , there is a corresponding element that is constructed by the coefficients of the m-vector. Clearly, the corresponding element is in Z n×m q . Hence, Lemma 3 can be used on R q . For simplicity, we write (A,
There is a polynomial time algorithm that outputs X ∈ Z m×k q that satisfies AX = U mod q with the following property:
where the remaining rows are zero. Then we obtain a similar result over R q by Lemma 4. For simplicity, we write X ←
E. REJECTION SAMPLING
We next recall rejection sampling, which is a useful technique to transform an arbitrary distribution to the desired distribution. In many signature schemes, we always store the information about the private key from the output distributions using rejection sampling.
Lemma 5 [13] :
Then the output distribution of the following two algorithms has a negligible statistical difference:
The statistical distance between the output of the above two algorithms is ε M .
F. LYUBASHEVSKY SIGNATURE SCHEME
We consider the LSS, in which the first signature is based on SIS without a trapdoor. The scheme does not use the hashand-sign model and uses rejection sampling to obtain the desired distribution. Simultaneously, the public key, private key, and signature size are smaller than those in previous studies. Then, we briefly present the scheme over Z q . Key generation:
Later, Lyubashevsky proposed a variant of the scheme based on the RSIS assumption. The details are available in [34] .
III. GROUP SIGNATURE, ANONYMITY, AND TRACEABILITY
In this section, we recall the definition of group signature by Bellare et al. [35] .
Definition 4 (Group Signature): A group signature scheme consists of four polynomial-time algorithms (GKg,GSig, GVer,Open):
• GKg(1 λ ,1 N ): a randomized group key generation algorithm that inputs 1 λ and 1 N , where λ is the security parameter and N is the group size, and returns group public key gpk, group manager's secret key gmsk and player's secret signing key gsk. 
The security requirements for the group signature have two aspects: anonymity and traceability. Before defining them, we introduce oracles that may be used by adversaries in security games.
• Signing oracle SO(gpk, gsk[·], ·): inputs user's index j ∈ [N ] and message µ, and returns valid signature of j for µ.
• Opening oracle OO(gpk, gmsk, ·, ·): inputs message µ and signature . If is generated by user j ∈ [N ] for µ, then returns the identity of user j; otherwise, returns ⊥.
• Corrupt oracle CO(·): inputs user's index j ∈ [N ] and outputs corresponding secret key gsk[j]. Definition 5 (Full Anonymity): Group signature scheme is anonymous if for any PPT adversary A and any polynomial n(·), the probability that A succeeds in the following game is negligible:
• Challenger C runs the group key generation algorithm with security parameter λ and group size N , and generates keys gpk, gmsk and gsk. Then C sends gpk and gsk to adversary A.
• Adversary A is given access to opening oracle OO(gpk, gmsk, ·, ·).
• A provides message µ and two valid identities 1
• A outputs guess b ∈ {0, 1}, and requires the following conditions:
-A did not query opening oracle OO(gpk, gmsk, ·, ·) with µ and * . Definition 6 (Full Traceability): Group signature scheme is traceable if for any PPT adversary A and any polynomial n(·), the probability that A succeeds in the following game is negligible:
• Challenger C runs the group key generation algorithm with security parameter λ and group size N , and generates keys gpk, gmsk and gsk. Then C sends gpk and gmsk to the adversary A.
• Adversary A is given access to signing oracle SO(gpk, gsk[·], ·) and corrupt oracle CO(·).
• Adversary A outputs forgery (µ * , * ), and requires the following conditions: -Ver(gpk, µ * , * ) = Accept.
-One of the following two conditions is satisfied: * Open(gpk, gmsk, µ * , * ) = ⊥. * ∃j * ∈ [N ] such that Open(gpk, gmsk, µ * , * ) = j * ∧ ((j * , µ * ) and j * not queried by A).
IV. GROUP SIGNATURE SCHEME
In this section, we describe the constant-size group signature scheme based on the lattice via the following four algorithms, where H 1 and H 2 are two different hash functions to B m,κ .
return ''Accept'' 8: else 9: return ''Reject'' 10: end if
A. GROUP KEY GENERATION ALGORITHM
In Algorithm 2, where λ is the security parameter and N is the number of group members, assume that T A GS = L and l = log (q − 1)/2 + 1. Then, the group manager creates a group public key that consists of two parts: (i) verification key (A, B, u) to the LSS, where B is also used for users to generate their short secret vectors with public syndromes as user key pairs; and (ii) two public keys from an extended version of the LPR encryption scheme [33] . The open key is the corresponding secret key of the two public keys. if κ k=1 max k (x i1 ) > U , then go to step 10 and restart 12 :
Algorithm 2 Key Generation Algorithm
if κ k=1 max k (x i2 ) > U , then go to step 13 and restart 15 : 16 : end for 17: outputs gpk = (A, B, u 
To enroll new users, for all i ∈ [N ], the group manager runs SampleD R q (A, T A , u−g i , σ 2 ) (as in Section 2) to obtain x i2 ∈ D m×n σ 2 such that Ax i2 + g i = u, where g i is the user's public key.
In the generation of the user's identity and the process of user joining the group, κ k=1 max k (·) is an operator for generating the κ largest entries of the input. We require that the κ largest entries of x i1 and x i2 are both smaller than U to obtain the desired distribution of z 1 and z 2 in the signing algorithm.
Hence, considering the public key of users, the group public key is gpk = (A, B, u, a, b, {g 
, the group manager's secret key is gmsk = s and the user's secret key is gsk =
). Remark 1: In the group key generation algorithm, it is impossible for e to be public. In the intervening time, e is not used in the group signing algorithm. Hence, it is also unnecessary to store e as the private key.
Algorithm 3 Signing Algorithm 1: Input: (gpk, gsk π , µ) 2: Output:
In Algorithm 3, to obtain a signature for message µ, user π first encrypts binary representation g π of user's public key g π using the two public keys. Then, user π randomly selects two vectors from [−B, B] m , that is, a uniform distribution over R q , and generates two hash values by combining values from two vectors and two public matrices with the above ciphertexts and message µ. Later, user π encrypts the binary representation c 1 of the hash value c 1 that can be verified by the user's public key directly. Finally, user π makes a hash function on the other hash value c 2 and the ciphertext, and generates the final result of the LSS using rejection sampling. The signature contains all ciphertexts, hash value c 2 , and two results of the LSS except the hash value. The concept of the design essentially borrows the Lyubashevshky signature model. Additionally, we introduce an IND-CCA encryption scheme to hide the signer's identity. In fact, we encrypt each coefficient of g π and c 1 using the IND-CCA encryption scheme. Simultaneously, for anonymity and traceability, we construct another ciphertext t 3 
that contains an intermediate product of the LSS.
In this way, the signing algorithm is very effective, and the signature size is much shorter than that in previous studies.
C. GROUP VERIFICATION ALGORITHM
In Algorithm 1, the group verification algorithm is similar to the LSS [13] .
Algorithm 4 Opening Algorithm
for all i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ nl do 6: if g i ≈ q 2 then 7:
g i = 1 8: else 9: g i = 0 10: end if 11: end for 12: for all j such that 1 ≤ j ≤ n do 13: g j = l i=1 2 i−1 g i+j 14: end for 15: g k = (g j ) 16 : 17: for all i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ nl do 18: if c i ≈ q 2 then 19: c i = 1 20: else 21: c i = 0 22: end if 23: end for 24: for all j such that 1 ≤ j ≤ n do 25 : 27 : end for 28: if c 1 = H 1 (µ, Bz 1 − g k c mod q, t 2 , t 1 )∧g k ∈ gpk then 29: return k 30: else 31: return ⊥ 32: end if D. GROUP OPENING ALGORITHM In Algorithm 4, after inputting group public key gpk, group manager's secret key gmsk, message µ and signature = (z 1 , z 2 , t 1 , t 2 , t 3 , c 2 )), the group manager computes t 2 − t 1 s, t 3 − t 1 s, and c = H 2 (c 2 , t 3 ). If the bound of the entry of t 2 − t 1 s is smaller than d( q) (the bound of e 2 + es 1 − e 1 s), then the corresponding entry g of g π is zero. If the bound of the entry of t 2 − t 1 s is close to q 2 , then the corresponding entry g of g π is one. Then, the group manager can recover g π = (g πj ) = ( l i=0 2 i g i+j ) for j = 1, · · · , n. The same approach can recover c 1 by t 3 − t 1 s. c 1 can be restored in the same manner. If c 1 = H 1 (µ, Bz 1 − g π c, t 2 , t 1 ) and g π ∈ gpk, then the algorithm returns π, otherwise, it returns ⊥.
We create t 3 is because the signature created by user π cannot be forged by any users who do not hold secret key g π . In this manner, the open algorithm not only reveals the signer's identity, but also ensures that the signature is only signed by the signer. It means that the open algorithm is more specific. It is not necessary to add another algorithm for the assessment of the result of the open algorithm and signature.
Group signature scheme can be described as above. Many efficient variants on the scheme exist, such as those based on LWE and SIS with the NTT technique, and those based on RLWE and RSIS with a rounding operation.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE GROUP SIGNATURE SCHEME
In this section, we first consider the parameters in the scheme. Then under the requirements of the parameters, the scheme is correct naturally. Finally, we reduce the security to the RLWE and RSIS problems. Thus, the scheme is anonymous and traceable in the random oracle model. H (µ, A y, c ) is uniformly distributed, which requires that sufficient choices of A y are hashed. Thus, (2B + 1) 2m ≥ 2 κ C κ m , which means that the probability of a collision for the hash function is smaller than 1 2 κ . Hence, the probability that the following simulator algorithm is aborted is at most 1 2 κ . Then, rejection sampling ensures that the distributions of z 1 and z 2 [13] .
Additionally, successful decryption requires that d < O(σ 2 1 ) q 2 and d is as small as possible. For more choices of d, refer to [29] .
Remark 2: We consider the κ largest entries of x i1 and x i2 for the pass rate of the signing algorithm. Because U = O( √ κσ 2 ), it is obvious that almost all values of x i1 c and x i2 c are included in U . The negligible values that are outside U can be disregarded. Thus, the repetition of key generation cannot be taken into consideration.
B. CORRECTNESS
The correctness of the scheme can be proved as follows: Suppose signature = (z 1 , z 2 , t 1 , t 2 , t 3 , c 2 ) is valid for message µ under group public key gpk = (A, B, u, {g 
1) VERIFICATION CORRECTNESS first generates c = H 2 (c 2 , t 2 ) and w 2 = Bz 1 + Az 2 − uc, then w 2 = By 1 + Ay 2 = v 2 mod q because of z 1 = y 1 + x π1 c, z 2 = y 2 + x π2 c and Ax π2 + Bx π1 = u mod q. Thus, c 2 
Additionally, the distributions of z 1 and z 2 are close to a uniform distribution on [−B, B] m using rejection sampling. Then ( z 1 ∞ ≤ B)∧( z 2 ∞ ≤ B). Hence, signature passes the verification.
2) OPENING CORRECTNESS
Because t 1 = as 1 + e 1 mod q, t 2 = bs 1 + e 2 + q 2 g π and t 3 = bs 1 −e 2 + q 2 c 1 , where g π is the binary representation of g π . Note that t 2 − t 1 s = es 1 
The rounding procedure in the open algorithm recovers g π with probability one. The same procedure is easily adapted to recover c 1 . We observe that v 1 = By 1 = Bz 1 − g π c. Then we have c 1 = H 1 (µ, Bz 1 − g π c, t 2 , t 1 ) . Thus, signature is created by user π .
C. FULL ANONYMITY
Roughly speaking, to prove full anonymity, we first show how we can simulate the signing algorithm by programming the random oracle. Then, we show that an adversary who breaks full anonymity using the simulator algorithm can be used to solve the RLWE problem. Program c 2 = H 1 (µ, w 2 , t 1 , t 2 ) and c 1 = H 1 (µ, w 1 , t 2 , t 1 ) 20: end if 21: 
First, we define the simulator algorithm as Algorithm 5. Then we have the following lemma.
Lemma 6: Suppose the parameters are defined as above, and the statistical distance between the output of the signing algorithm and the simulator algorithm, which does not take the user's secret key gsk[i] as input, is at most 1 
The difference between the signing algorithm and the simulator algorithm is the generation of z 1 , z 2 , c 1 , and c 2 . The value of
obtains a set uniformly at random in the simulator algorithm, whereas in the signing algorithm, H 1 checks whether H 1 was already evaluated on (µ, By 1 + Ay 2 , t 1 , t 2 ). The simulator algorithm differs from the signing algorithm in the case that the value of By 1 + Ay 2 is equal to one of the previous values that was queried. The probability of a collision is at most 1 2 κ . Similar to c 2 , we obtain the same result for c 1 . The distribution of z 1 and z 2 in the signing algorithm is indistinguishable from a uniform distribution on [−B + U , B − U ] m using rejection sampling, and the statistical distance between them is at most 2( (2U ) m (2B+1) m M ). Thus, the statistical distance between the output of the signing algorithm and the simulator algorithm is at most 1 
which is negligible under the parameters set as above.
Theorem 1: Let the parameters be as presented above and κ be sufficiently large. Then the signature scheme is anonymous under the RLWE assumption in the random oracle model.
Proof: We construct a series of games where we make changes to prove the full anonymity of the scheme.
Game 0: Suppose that challenger C runs the group key generation algorithm with security parameter λ and group size N , and generates keys gpk, gmsk and gsk. Then C sends gpk and gsk to adversary A. When A queries OO(gpk, gmsk, ·, ·) with (µ , ), index k ∈ [N ] or ⊥ is returned. Thus, in Game 0, the adversary A first selects two signers' indexes i 0 , i 1 ∈ {1, · · · , N } with i 0 = i 1 and message µ, and sends them to challenger C. Then challenger C chooses b ∈ {0, 1}, and calls the real signing algorithm with (gpk, z 2 , t 1 , t 2 , t 3 , c 2 ) is returned by the simulator algorithm. We observe that the user's identity is only used for generating t 2 and t 3 in the simulator algorithm, which does not have the user's private key. t 2 and t 3 are the only two places where an adversary may obtain some efficient information about the identity of the real signer, and also are the ciphertexts of the following encryption scheme E.
It is easy to check that the probability of Game 1 succeeding is equal to the probability that adversary A breaks E. Consider E, whose security game Game 2 can be simplified as follows: Challenger C first calls key generation algorithm to obtain public keys (a, b = as + e mod q) and secret key s, and then sends the public keys to adversary A. Moreover, adversary A can access the encryption oracle and decryption oracle. Thus, A selects two messages x 0 and x 1 for challenger C, C calls the encryption algorithm with x b which is randomly chosen from the two messages, and the plaintext is provided to A. Finally, A outputs guess b for encrypted message x b . Note that E is the extension of LPR encryption scheme [33] , which is IND-CCA secure via the Naor-Yung transform [36] such that x ∞ ≤ 7σ 2 (σ 2 > 1), then with a probability of at least 1 − 4 −n , there exists another
Proof. The proof of the lemma can be found in Lemma 2 in [9] .
Theorem 2: Let the parameters be as presented above and κ, and n are sufficiently large. The signature scheme is traceable under the RSIS assumption in the random oracle. Proof. Suppose that adversary A can defeat the traceability of the scheme with non-negligible success probability ε in the game in Definition 6. We build a PPT algorithm B that attacks the RSIS problem with non-negligible probability.
When providing verification key (A, B, g j , u) , simulator B runs the experiment in Definition 6 faithfully.. When A queries its signing oracle SO on i ∈ [N ], message µ and gpk: If i = j, then B runs the honest signing algorithm and returns GSig(gpk, gsk[i], µ); If i = j, then B runs the simulator algorithm and returns the output of the simulator algorithm with gpk, j and µ. When A queries its corrupt oracle CO on i ∈ [N ]: If i = j, then B returns gsk[i]; If i = j, then B returns ⊥. In particular, regardless of whether index i ∈ [N ] has been queried to corrupt oracle CO by A, we can replace the real signing algorithm with the simulator algorithm when A queries the signing oracle with i. Suppose A makes h hash queries and s signing queries. Finally A outputs signature = (z 1 , z 2 , t 1 , t 2 , t 3 , c 2 ) on message µ for the player j ∈ [N ]. With non-negligible probability, A wins the game. Then one of the following two conditons can be satisfied.
The first condition is that is a valid signature with respect to t 1 , t 2 and t 3 for j.
In the random oracle model, with overwhelming probability, H 1 (µ, v 2 , t 1 , t 2 ) and H 1 (µ, v 1 , t 2 , t 1 ) must have been defined. In the following analysis, we simply ignore the collision event with random oracle H 1 , which occurs with negligible probability. There exist two possible cases.
The first case is that c 1 and c 2 were returned by the singing oracle when dealing with message µ made by forger adversary A. Then c 1 and c 2 have been queried. Specifically, A always obtained a signature of the form (z 1 , z 2 , t 1 , t 2 , t 3 , c 2 ) on the message µ , where c = H 2 (c 2 , t 3 ). We define
Then we have
In the random oracle model, with overwhelming probability it holds that:
Additionally, note that t 3 and t 3 are the ciphertexts of c 1 . Then t 2 , t 3 , c 2 , c) . Then under operator mod q,
can be a solution to the RSIS n,q,m+1,2B problem. By contrast, the valid signature is on message µ for player j queried to the signing oracle, which means that the case does not exist for (j, µ) that was queried by A according to the full traceability game.
The second case is that
were not returned by the signing oracle, but obtained from some query to random oracle H 1 on query (µ, v 1 , v 2 , t 1 , t 2 ). In this case, we rewind the program to the point (µ, v 1 , c 1 , c 2 ) and (µ, v 2 , t 2 , t 1 ) of defining H 1 (µ, v 2 , t 1 , t 2 ) and H 1 (µ, v 1 , t 2 , t 1 ), and redefine the random oracle output such that c 2 = H 1 (µ, v 2 , t 1 , t 2 ) and c 1 = H 1 (µ, v 1 , t 2 , t 1 ). With overwhelming probability, c 1 = c 1 and c 2 = c 2 . By the forking lemma, we obtain another valid signature (z 1 , z 2 , t 1 , t 2 , t 3 , c 2 ) on the same message µ with probability ε( ε h+s − 1 2 κ ), such that Bz 1 − g j c = Bz 1 − g j c mod q,
We claim that
where g j = Bx j1 and Ax j2 + Bx j1 = u. {By Lemma 7, we know that there is at least a 1 − 4 −n chance that there exists another key gsk[j] = (x j1 , x j2 ) such that Bx j1 = Bx j1 mod q and Ax j2 = Ax j2 mod q. This shows that for gsk [j] with (z 1 − z 1 
A does not know any information about the secret key; hence, we obtain a non-zero answer with a probability of at least 1/2.} Because z 1 , c − c) can be a solution to the RSIS n,q,m+1,2B problem.
The second condition is that the output of the open algorithm is ⊥. There exist two possible cases. The first case is that g j / ∈ gpk, then signature is a valid forgery of the LSS with public keys (A, B, u) . The second case is that c 1 = H 1 (µ, Bz 1 − g j c mod q, t 2 , t 1 ) ∧ g j ∈ gpk, then signature is a valid forgery of the LSS with public key (A, B, u) . Then B(z 1 − z 1 ) + A(z 2 − z 2 ) = 0 mod q or B(z 1 − z 1 ) + A(z 2 − z 2 ) − u(c − c) = 0 mod q. These cases breaks the unforgeability of the LSS that is based on the RSIS assumption, and more details about the proof is similar to the proof of the first condition.
To summarize, the scheme is traceable under the RSIS assumption in the random oracle model. Remark 3: From the proof of the above theorem, we observe that if either c 1 or c 2 was queried to the signing oracle, then falsification fails for (j, µ) queried by A. This is the reason that we do not take into account other cases.
E. COMPARISON
In this subsection, we provide a clear size comparison with the work of Ling el.at in TABLE 1. Before presenting the table, we provide some notation.
• k is a positive integer, q =Õ(n 4 ) • l = log(q/2) + 1, m ≥ 2 log q + 2,m = m + k • c > 1 is a real constant, d ≥ log c (ω(log n)), c d ≥ c d /(c − 1) • β =Õ(n), B =Õ(n 5/4 ), δ β = log 2 β + 1,δ B = log 2 B + 1 Furthermore, we describe the size difference between the two schemes with the security parameter λ as follows.
VI. CONCLUSION
We presented a new constant-size group signature scheme based on the RLWE and RSIS assumptions. In the key generation algorithm, we used trapdoor algorithms over R q to enroll new users and create the common public equation, which is the first difference from [9] and reduces the number of public matrices to two. In the signing algorithm and verification algorithm, the LSS with an IND-CCA encryption scheme constitute the procedure, which is the second difference from [9] and reduce the signature size. In the open algorithm, we not only decrypted the ciphertext from the IND-CCA encryption scheme, but also made a verification from the LSS, which is the third difference from [9] and ensured that the signature was only produced by the signer from the open algorithm. Compared with [9] , our construction is efficient in the signing algorithm, more precise on the open algorithm and shorter in the public key, private key, and signature size. However, rejection sampling may cause some loss in efficiency. Moreover, the scheme has full traceability and full anonymity under the RLWE and RSIS assumptions, which allow us to select the high argument. Although, because of the trapdoor in the setup stage, the scheme may restricted in practical applications. To determine efficient group signatures without the trapdoor is an interesting future work. We will consider whether there is another approach to construct the lattice-based constant-size group signature.
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